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I. Introduction                                     
Ali al-Timimi (“al- Timimi”) is an outspoken Muslim scholar who is well respected in the 
worldwide Muslim community.  In his fervent support of Muslims everywhere, he has openly 
proclaimed that America is one of the chief enemies of the Muslim populace.1  He has 
proclaimed that the explosion of the space shuttle Columbia was a sign for Muslims to take 
action.2  He has urged young Muslim men to jihad, to wage armed conflict with the enemies of 
Islam.3  It is safe to say that al-Timimi has made numerous speeches that most Americans would 
find highly objectionable.
On September 23, 2004, the Federal government charged al-Timimi with a six-count 
indictment4, which was later superceded by the present ten-count indictment.5  During the trial in 
April 2005, the prosecution introduced over 250 evidentiary exhibits6, testimony from several 
expert witnesses on radical Islamism7, and testimony from various government agents.  In 
1
 Presentencing Report for Muhammed Aatique at 17, United States v. Khan, (No. 03-296-A).
2
 Presentencing Report for Muhammed Aatique at 17, United States v. Khan, (No. 03-296-A).
3
 Transcripts, Rebuttal Argument by Mr. Kromberg, Pleading 123 at 14, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 
1:04cr385).
4
 Indictment, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385), available at http://www.altimimi.org.
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 Superceding Indictment, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385), available at http://www.altimimi.org.
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addition, the prosecution introduced the testimony from several co-conspirators that were 
convicted in an earlier trial8, all of whom were facing draconian sentences under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines unless they cooperated with the government9.  Yet, with this mountain of 
evidence, the direct evidence that al-Timimi was actually involved in any illegal activity is quite 
limited.  In fact, the pivotal evidence against al-Timimi centers on the corroborated testimony of 
the co-conspirators that al-Timimi was present at a two-hour meeting at one of the co-
conspirator’s home on 16 September, 2001, five days after the tragedy of 9/11.10  The testimony 
alleged that al-Timimi incited the attendees to take up jihad with the Taliban, even to the extent 
that the jihadists would probably engage in direct action with American forces in Afghanistan.11
The jury began deliberations on April 18, 2005.12  Buried in nearly 200 pages of jury 
instructions was a single paragraph that unceremoniously described the law of protected speech 
under Brandenburg v. Ohio.13  After deliberating for seven days, the jury returned a verdict of 
guilty on all ten counts.14  Al-Timimi was subsequently sentenced to life in prison plus 70 
years.15
The trial of United States of America v. Ali Al-Timimi16 raises a number of important First 
Amendment issues.  To adequately assess these issues, a foundation must be laid describing the 
facts of the Al-Timimi case as well as the prior co-conspirator trial, United States v. Khan.17
Next, the foundation will explore the applicable First Amendment and Federal law as well as 
8
 Transcripts, Testimony of Yong Ki Kwon, Muhammed Aatique, Khwaja Mahmood Hasan, United States v. Al-
Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
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 Jerry Markon, 10 Years For Man Who Aided Jihad Probe, The Washington Post, December 18, 2003, A20.
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 Transcript, Pleading 97, Testimony of Yong Ki Kwon at 46, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
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 Transcript, Pleading 98, Testimony of Yong Ki Kwon at 5-11, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
12 Crime & Justice, The Washington Post, April 26, 2005, B2.
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 Jury Instructions, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
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 Jerry Markon, Muslim Leader Is Found Guilty, The Washington Post, April 27, 2005, A1.
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 Jerry Markon, Va. Muslim Lecturer Sentenced To Life, The Washington Post, July 14, 2005, B1.
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 No. 1:04cr385.
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relevant cases, including a case that is remarkably similar to the al-Timimi case, United States v. 
Rahman18.  
Two themes emerge from this foundation.  The first theme is that the courts have had 
difficulty defining the line between protected advocacy and criminal speech, or in other words, 
whether or how Brandenburg should be applied.  The second theme is that in the decision 
process between advocacy and criminal speech, the courts will lean toward criminal speech when 
the gravity of that solicited activity is sufficiently grave, especially in the context of national 
security.  Repeatedly the courts have demonstrated that there is an inverse relationship between 
gravity of danger and freedom of speech: when the circumstances are sufficiently grave there 
will be less freedoms.   Unfortunately for al-Timimi, he was prosecuted under the gravity of 
danger of terrorism.  While it may be debatable whether terrorism represents one of the gravest 
dangers this country has ever faced, it is one that the government has taken very seriously, 
having already scaled back fundamental Constitutional rights under the Patriot Act.  Reminiscent 
of the prosecutions of supposed Communists amidst the hysteria of McCarthyism, the 
government has brought down swift and furious punishment upon anyone even remotely 
connected to terrorism.
In the final analysis, I will assert that the United States government did not meet its 
burden of proof and that there was a reasonable doubt as to what Timimi advocated.  
Furthermore, if Timimi looses his appeal, the fundamental constitutional right of free speech will 
take a serious blow.
18
 189 F.3d 88 (1999).
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II. Foundation
A. Ali al-Timimi Biography
The following is a summary of Ali al-Timimi’s biography taken exclusively from the 
www.altimimi.org website.19
Al- Timimi was born in 1963 in Washington, D.C. to Muslim parents who worked in the 
Iraqi Embassy.  In 1978, his parents moved to Saudi Arabia.  In school there, he received 
instruction in the Qur’an, learned how to pray, fast, and other basic Islamic information.  From 
an early age he was intrigued by the depiction of Judgement Day in the Qur’an and started a 
lifelong inquiry of the harbingers and omens of the approach of the foretold apocalypse.
Two years later, at 17, he returned to the United States to attend college.  However, the 
United States had changed.  In the interim, the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan and 
militant Muslim students had overrun the United States Embassy in Tehran and taken the 
embassy staff hostage.  In contrast to the indifference experienced by Muslims in earlier years, 
al-Timimi perceived a growing intolerance of Muslims in the United States.  In response, he 
devoted himself to the study of Islam.  In 1987, while thousands of Muslims were pouring into 
Afghanistan to join the mujahideen, he traveled to Medina, Saudi Arabia, to study at the college 
of Haddith.  He returned to the United States a year later.
In his secular world, unable to find a job with his undergraduate degree in biology, al-
Timimi went back to school and earned a degree in computer science.  After a number of years 
in the IT field, he was drawn to the biotech industry’s attempt to map the human genome where 
he could combine his two fields of study, biology and computer science.  He eventually earned a 
19
 About Ali Al-Timimi, www.altimimi.org.  Al-Timimi’s full biography and many of lectures can be found this 
website.  Also available on the website are numerous court motions written his defense counsel.
Tim Davis
5
Ph.D. in Computational Biology from George Mason University and was awarded the degree in 
December 2004 while on bond awaiting trial.
During this same time period after his return from Medina, al-Timimi started lecturing on 
various topics of Islam and became a well-respected lecturer in the worldwide Muslim 
community.  He lectured at various conferences, and in particular at the Islamic Assembly of 
North America (“IANA”) conferences.  He became a frequent and popular speaker at the Dar al-
Arqam Center that he helped co-found.
B. The Wahhabism Connection
Wahhabism is a strain of Islam that originated in the 1740s in the Arabian desert.20
Wahhabiya, a puritanical asceticism, is considered by many to be a spiritual movement 
comparable in force and influence to the rise of Islam itself.21  Wahhabism has sought to purge 
many of the corrupting influences in Islam and return it to a more original orthodoxy.22 Among 
the beliefs of Wahhabism are that any non-Wahhabist is considered an infidel, failure to adhere 
to the faith’s tenets draw severe punishment, and that the church and state should be one under 
the rule of Sharia.23 Relegated chiefly to the interior of Arabia for the 18th and 19th centuries, 
Wahhabism has flourished in the 20th century under the patronage of the House of Saud.24  It is 
no surprise that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers that participated in the 9/11 attacks were Saudi.25
In the aftermath of 9/11, the FBI started to investigate various organizations whose 
20 Susan Schmidt, Spreading Saudi Fundamentalism in U.S., The Washington Post, October 2, 2003, A1.
21
 Abington Dictionary of Living Religions, Keith Crim (General Editor), Roger A. Bullard and Larry D. Shinn 
(Associate Editors), Copyright 1981, Parthenon Press at Nashville, Tennessee, USA, Section Islam, page 355.
22 Susan Schmidt, Spreading Saudi Fundamentalism in U.S., The Washington Post, October 2, 2003, A1.
23 Susan Schmidt, Spreading Saudi Fundamentalism in U.S., The Washington Post, October 2, 2003, A1.
24
 Abington Dictionary of Living Religions, Keith Crim (General Editor), Roger A. Bullard and Larry D. Shinn 
(Associate Editors), Copyright 1981, Parthenon Press at Nashville, Tennessee, USA, Section Islam, page 355; Susan 
Schmidt, Spreading Saudi Fundamentalism in U.S., The Washington Post, October 2, 2003, A1.
25
 Craig Whitlock, Saudis Confront Extremist Ideologies, The Washington Post, February 6, 2005, A18.
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purpose was to incite violent jihad and recruit people to fight it.26  The FBI was conducting 
independent investigations in Idaho, Michigan, New York and Northern Virginia until they 
realized that there might be a connection, namely Wahhabism.27  The Northern Virginia 
investigations culminated in Khan and Al-Timimi trials.  The Idaho investigation resulted in the 
prosecution of Sami Omar Hussayen, the nephew of the Saleh Ibn Abdul Rahman Hussayen, a 
minister in the Saudi government who has tenuous connections with numerous Saudi-funded 
charities that have links to terrorist groups.28  Sami Hussayen was recently acquitted of all 
charges based on a First Amendment defense.29
While it is unconfirmed that al-Timimi is in fact a Salafi (a Salafi is a non-Saudi adherent 
of Wahhabism), he has a number of connections with other Salafis and Wahhabists.  Firstly, Al-
Timimi has given speeches at conferences sponsered by the IANA, which is a known Wahhabi 
organization dedicated to the teachings of two radical Saudi Muslim clerics, Safar Hawali and 
Salman Ouda.30  Al- Timimi had maintained contact with Hawali, a fact that the government tried 
to introduce at trial.31  However, in an attempt to alleviate some CIPA concerns, Judge Brinkema 
ruled it inadmissible.32  Al-Timimi has also maintained a relationship with Bassem K. Khafagi, a 
former president of IANA who has recently plead guilty to bank fraud in Detroit.33  Secondly, 
another frequent lecturer at the Center was Jafaar Idris, an internationally known Salafi imam.34
Idris is the president of the American Open University in Fairfax, which promotes Salafi 
26 Susan Schmidt, Spreading Saudi Fundamentalism in U.S., The Washington Post, October 2, 2003, A1.
27 Susan Schmidt, Spreading Saudi Fundamentalism in U.S., The Washington Post, October 2, 2003, A1.
28 Susan Schmidt, Spreading Saudi Fundamentalism in U.S., The Washington Post, October 2, 2003, A1.
29
 Susan Schmidt, Saudi Acquitted of Internet Terror;Defense Hails Verdict on Islamic Sites as Victory for Free 
Speech, The Washington Post, June 11, 2004, A3.
30 Susan Schmidt, Spreading Saudi Fundamentalism in U.S., The Washington Post, October 2, 2003, A1.
31
 Government’s Motion For Reconsideration of the Breadth of Ruling Regarding Evidence Involving Hawali, 
Pelading 71, March 22, 2005, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
32
 Order, March 20, 2005, , United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
33 Susan Schmidt, Spreading Saudi Fundamentalism in U.S., The Washington Post, October 2, 2003, A1.
34 Susan Schmidt, Spreading Saudi Fundamentalism in U.S., The Washington Post, October 2, 2003, A1.
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teaching on the web.35  Lastly, al-Timimi has lectured at the Islamic Foundation of America 
(IFA), which was founded by Idris and another Saudi cleric, Ibrahim Ibn Kulaib.36  Among the 
well known Wahhabi and Salafi visitors at the IFA have been Saleh Hussayen, the minister in the 
Saudi government, and Sirhaj Wirhaj, a New York imam who was an unindicted co-conspirator 
in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.37
C. Factual Background
On February 9, 2004, the government opened its case against the “Virginia jihad 
network”38 in United States v. Khan39.  The “network” was charged with numerous serious 
Federal crimes including conspiracy to contribute services to the Taliban and other terrorist 
organizations, conspiracy to levy war against the United States, and violation of the Neutrality 
Act.40  The 11 defendants of the “network” were regular attendees at the Dar al-Arqam Center 
(“Center”) in Falls Church, VA.41  The Center was co-founded by Ali al-Timimi to provide 
English language instruction on Islam.42  A year later, on April 4, 2005, the government opened 
its case against al-Timimi.43  He was charged with inciting and/or aiding and abetting the 
“network” to commit their crimes.44
1. United States v. Khan
35 Susan Schmidt, Spreading Saudi Fundamentalism in U.S., The Washington Post, October 2, 2003, A1.
36 Susan Schmidt, Spreading Saudi Fundamentalism in U.S., The Washington Post, October 2, 2003, A1.
37 Susan Schmidt, Spreading Saudi Fundamentalism in U.S., The Washington Post, October 2, 2003, A1.
38
 Jerry Markon, Va. Jihad Case Opens Against Muslim Men, Washington Post, Feb. 10, 2004, at B1.
39
 309 F. Supp. 2d 789 (D. Va. 2004).
40 Id. at 795.
41 Id. at 794, 802.
42 Id. at 802.
43
 Jerry Markon, Terrorism Case Puts Words of Muslim Leader On Trial in Va., Washington Post, April 5, 2005, at 
B1.
44
 Superceding Indictment, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385), available at http://www.altimimi.org; 
Government’s Response to Defendant’s Supplemental Pre-Trial Motions, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 
1:04cr385).
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Defendants:  Randall Todd Royer, masoud Ahmad Khan, Ibrahim Ahmed al-Hamdi, 
Yong Ki Kwon, Muhammed Aatique, Seifullah Chapman, Hammad Abur-Raheem, Donal 
Surratt, Caliph Basha Ibn Abdur-Raheem, Khwaja Mahmood Hasan, Sabri Benkhala.
While some of the defendants in the Khan case knew each other from college, the 
defendants’ primary connection was through their association with the Center.45  In early January 
2000, Nabil Gharbieh, a Center co-founder, and Kwon, reached a decision that to order to 
prepare for jihad they would conduct military training by playing paintball.46  Eventually all of 
the defendants played paintball with the expressed purpose of training for jihad.47  Several 
defendants acquired weapons such as AK-47s and sniper rifles along with other less exotic 
weapons.48  In April 2000, Royer went to Pakistan to obtain military training at a camp run by 
Laskar-e-Taiba (“LET”) in Pakistan.49  LET is an organization dedicated to violent jihad 
defending the rights of Muslims in the disputed Kashmir region of India and Pakistan.  The 
United States designated LET as a foreign terrorism organization (“FTO”) in December of 
2001.50  Following Royer’s footsteps, al-Hamdi in August 2000 and the Chapman in August 
2001 went to Pakistan to train at the LET camps.51  Testimony was introduced that while at the 
LET camp, al-Hamdi fired a weapon at Indian troops.52  All three of these defendants returned to 
the United States after completing their training.53  Aatique had already purchased tickets for a 
trip Pakistan slated for September 19, 2001, a trip he took despite the tragic events of 9/11.54
45
 Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 802-03.
46 Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 803.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 816; Transcript, Pleading 97, Testimony of Yong Ki Kwon at 27, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 
1:04cr385).
49
 Transcript, Opening Statement by Mr. Kromberg at 7, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
50
 Transcript, Opening Statement by Mr. Kromberg at 14, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
51
 Transcript, Opening Statement by Mr. Kromberg at 14, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
52
 Presentencing Report for Muhammed Aatique, United States v. Khan, (No. 03-296-A).
53 Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 807-09.
54 Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 810-11.
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Two days after 9/11, al-Timimi asked Kwon “to organize a plan in case of anti-Muslim 
backlash and to get the brothers together.”55  Kwon and Royer made all of the phone calls and set 
up the meeting for Sunday September 16, 2001 at Kwon’s home.56  At the meeting, attended by 
al-Timimi, it is alleged that al-Timimi incited the group for violent jihad in support of the 
Taliban.  In the next few days, four of the meeting attendees, Kwon, Khan, Hasan, and Aatique, 
will fly to Pakistan with the intention to attend the LET camps.57  Khan arranged his flight so he 
could accompany Aatique on September 19, 2001, since Aatique already had a reservation on a 
flight to Pakistan for that day.58
At another meeting in early October, 2001, al-Timimi exhorted five other members of the 
paintball group to take up jihad in support of the Taliban.59  In attendance were Ali Asad 
Chandia and the defendants Hamdi, Hammad Abdur-Raheem, Caliph Basha Ibn Abdur-Raheem, 
and Surratt.60  Within days of the second meeting, Surratt and Chandia left the country.61
Chandia went to Pakistan and the LET camps and Surratt simply left the country (hijra).62
All of the LET camp trainees took part in various weapons training including automatic 
weapons, grenades, RPGs, and anti-aircraft guns.63  However, after the start of open hostilities 
against the Taliban on October 20, 2001, the Pakistanis closed their border with Afghanistan.64
In addition, the Pakistani government was actively evicting foreign fighters from the camps.65
Consequently, the defendants still at the camps, Khan, Hasan, and Kwon, learned that LET 
55
 Transcript, Pleading 97, Testimony of Yong Ki Kwon at 41, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
56
 Transcript, Pleading 97, Testimony of Yong Ki Kwon at 41, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
57 Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 810-11.
58 Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 810-11.
59
 Transcript, Opening Statement by Mr. Kromberg at 12, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
60
 Transcript, Opening Statement by Mr. Kromberg at 12, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
61
 Transcript, Opening Statement by Mr. Kromberg at 12, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
62
 Transcript, Opening Statement by Mr. Kromberg at 12, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
63 Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 810-27.
64 Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 811.
65 Id.
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would no longer facilitate their travel to Afghanistan.66  Instead, Khan and Hasan returned to the 
United States and Kwon remained in Pakistan to start a mango export business.67
Six of the defendants agreed to plea-bargain deals before trial which required that they 
cooperate with the government and testify against the others that went on trial.  Of the five 
remaining defendants that stood trial, all but one of them were found guilty.  The lone exception, 
Sabri Benkhala, was acquitted of all charges in a separate trial.68  In a post-trial motion for 
acquittal, some charges were dropped against some of the defendants, and all the charges against 
Caliph Basha were dismissed with prejudice.69  Bound by Federal guidelines, Judge Leonie 
Brinkema sentenced Khan to life in prison plus 50 years, Chapman to 85 years, and Adbur-
Raheem to 97 months.70  As a result of their plea-bargained agreements, Royer received 20 
years, al-Hamdi received 15 years, Hasan received 11 years and 3 months, Kwon received 11 
years and 6 months, Aatique received 12 years and 6 months, Surratt received 3 years and 10 
months.71  In a later adjustment mandated by the then recent Supreme Court decision in United 
States v. Booker72, Judge Brinkema reduced Khan’s sentence to life in prison plus 30 years, 
Chapman’s sentence was reduced to 65 years, and Abdur-Raheem’s sentence was reduced to 52 
months.73
2. United States v. Ali al-Timimi
66 Id.
67 Id.
68
 Jerry Markon, Judge Acquits Final Defendant In 'Virginia Jihad' Investigation, Washington Post, March 10, 2004, 
B8.
69 Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 796.
70
 Jerry Markon, Strict Sentences Meted in Va. Jihad Case, Washington Post, June 16, 2004, A6.
71 Randall Todd Royer and Ibrahim Ahmed al-Hamdi Sentenced for Participating in Virginia Jihad Network, 
Federal Information and News Dispatch, Inc., Justice Department Press Releases, April 9, 2004; Defendants 
Convicted in Northern Virginia ‘Jihad’ Trial, Federal Information and News Dispatch, Inc., Justice Department 
Press Releases, March 4, 2004.
72
 125 S. Ct. 738 (2004).
73
 Jerry Markon, U.S. Judge Reduces 'Va. Jihad' Sentences, Washington Post, July 30, 2005, A3.
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The government’s primary contention was that al-Timimi, through his lectures and direct 
personal appeals, induced and/or aided and abetted members of the “Virginia jihad network” to 
leave the country and pursue jihad training with the intent to defend the Taliban against all 
potential enemies, including the United States.74  A key ingredient of the prosecution’s case was 
that al-Timimi was the ringleader of the “Virginia jihad network” and that the defendants in the 
Khan trial “couldn’t figure out how to tie their shoelaces without asking al-Timimi.”75
Al- Timimi was described as a well respected lecturer at the Center, accordingly many 
attendees at the Center often asked al-Timimi for advice on wide variety of Islamic matters.76
The government elicited testimony that followers on many occasions asked al-Timimi advice on 
minor, almost trivial, Islamic matters such as whether one can pray in a moving car or whether 
one may shorten prayers on the discovery of a scorpion.77  On several occasions the paintball 
group asked al-Timimi’s advice on the matters pertaining to paintball.  Through an intermediary, 
Nabil Gharbieh, Kwon asked al-Timimi what he thought of the paintball, to which Gharbieh 
related that al-Timimi said, “That is something good that the brothers can do.”78  In September 
2000, FBI agents approached Chapman and questioned him about his paintball activities.79  In 
response to a request for guidance, Al-Timimi said to continue to play because if you stop, it will 
look more suspicious, and be more discrete in the future.80  Al- Timimi related the parable from 
the Qur’an about Joseph’s brothers entering the city through many doors to disguise their 
74
 Superceding Indictment, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385), available at http://www.altimimi.org; 
Government’s Response to Defendant’s Supplemental Pre-Trial Motions, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 
1:04cr385).
75
 Transcripts, Rebuttal Argument by Mr. Kromberg, Pleading 123 at 5, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 
1:04cr385).
76 Transcripts, Testimony of Yong Ki Kwon, Pleading 97 at 5, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
77
 Transcripts, Rebuttal Argument by Mr. Kromberg, Pleading 123 at 6, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 
1:04cr385).
78
 Transcripts, Testimony of Yong Ki Kwon, Pleading 97 at 43, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
79 Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 803.
80
 Transcripts, Testimony of Yong Ki Kwon, Pleading 97 at 45, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
Tim Davis
12
numbers.81  Soon afterward, the paintball group discontinued playing at local public courses and 
moved their activities to a private farmland in Spotsylvania County.82
Sometimes, the lectures would be held at various homes usually accompanied with 
dinner.83  On September 11, 2001, al-Timimi was supposed to attend a dinner and give a 
lecture.84  When the group met for dinner, they decided to cancel the lecture in light of the tragic 
events of that day.  The government contended that at the dinner al-Timimi expressed his 
approval of the attacks and was seeking justification for the attacks in a tense argument with 
Haytham Hantash and Jafaar Idris, another co-founder of the Center.85  In the Khan trial, two 
witnesses, Gharbieh and Surratt, testified that al-Timimi said the attacks were not Islamically 
justifiable but that U.S. foreign policy had precipitated the attacks.86  The government’s one 
witness to the contrary, Hasan, was discredited in cross-examination during the Kahn trial.87  In a 
pre-trial motion to the al-Timimi trial, Judge Brinkema denied without opinion the defense’s pre-
trial motion to suppress Hasan’s testimony at the forthcoming al-Timimi’s trial.88  In any event, 
the prosecution did not elicit this testimony from Hasan.89  However, Mr. Kromberg referenced 
this topic in his closing argument.90  In a post-trial motion, the defense raised this very point as 
81
 Transcripts, Testimony of Yong Ki Kwon, Pleading 97 at 46, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
82 Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 803.
83
 Transcripts, Testimony of Yong Ki Kwon, Pleading 97 at 7, 13, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
84
 Kwon April 11th cross at 56, , United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
85
 Motion In Limine Regarding The Government’s Unsupported And Prejudicial Claim That The Defendant 
Expressed Approval For The Events Of September 11, 2001 at 1-3, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
86
 Motion In Limine Regarding The Government’s Unsupported And Prejudicial Claim That The Defendant 
Expressed Approval For The Events Of September 11, 2001 at 4, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
87
 Motion In Limine Regarding The Government’s Unsupported And Prejudicial Claim That The Defendant 
Expressed Approval For The Events Of September 11, 2001 at 1-3, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
88
 Order dated March 18, 2005, Pleading 65, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
89
 Transcripts, Testimony of Khwaja Mahmood Hasan, Pleading 117 at 10-52, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 
1:04cr385).
90
 Transcripts, Rebuttal Argument by Mr. Kromberg, Pleading 123 at 11, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 
1:04cr385).
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prejudicial,91 however Judge Brinkema denied the motion.
Two days after 9/11, al-Timimi asked Kwon “to organize a plan in case of anti-Muslim 
backlash and to get the brothers together.”92  On September 16, 2001, al-Timimi attended the 
meeting at Kwon’s home.93  Among the attendees were al-Timimi, Caliph Basha Abdur-Raheem, 
Hammad Abdur-Raheem, Hasan, Khan, Aatique, and Royer.94  When al- Timimi arrived he told 
the group to turn off their phones, unplug the answering machine, and pull down the curtains.95
Al-Timimi then told them that this meeting was “amana” (trust) which meant that the attendees 
were not to talk about the meeting.96  Hasan gave testimony that Al-Timimi said that Mullah 
Omar has called upon the Muslims to defend Afghanistan.97  The government wanted to 
introduce evidence that the reason al-Timimi brought up the subject of Afghanistan was in part 
because Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban, had called for Muslims from all parts of the 
world to defend the Taliban against imminent attack.98  The defense counsel successfully filed a 
motion to block the government from introducing that evidence.99  Even though the government 
could not allege that al-Timimi was attempting to recruit jihad fighters for the Taliban, there is 
other evidence to support a conclusion that Afghanistan was a topic of discussion by the group 
that night.100
Later at the same meeting, Al-Timimi read parts of the al-Uqla fatwa to the group and 
91
 Defendant’s Motion For A New Trial at 6-7, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385), available at 
www.altimimi.org.
92
 Transcript, Pleading 97, Testimony of Yong Ki Kwon at 41, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
93
 Transcript, Pleading 97, Testimony of Yong Ki Kwon at 46, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
94
 Transcript, Opening Statement by Mr. Kromberg at 9, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
95
 Transcript, Pleading 97, Testimony of Yong Ki Kwon at 51, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385).
96
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gave the fatwa to Khan with the instructions to burn it after he has read it.101  Al- Timimi tells the 
group that they must join the mujahideen and that it does not matter who they fight, Indians, 
Russians, or Americans.102  Al- Timimi said that the duty to take up jihad is “fard ayn” –
obligatory to all Muslims.103  Al- Timimi offers the group a choice: 1) to take up jihad and defend 
the Muslims in Afghanistan, 2) to go and make hijra (leave the United States to avoid supporting 
the government by paying taxes), or 3) to lay like a rug in your house.104  Three days later, on 
September 19, Aatique and Khan fly to Pakistan and eventually make their way to the LET camp 
for military training.105  That same day, Kwon and Hasan meet and have lunch with al-Timimi.106
Kwon testified that al-Timimi told them not to take anything suspicious, and in the event that 
Hasan is stopped that Kwon should stop as well because he will not be able to find his way 
around Pakistan.107  Hasan testified that al-Timimi told them to take precautions, carry a 
magazine, and if stopped that they should cry like a baby.108  The next day, Kwon and Hasan 
make the trip to Pakistan.109
One month later, in early to mid October, another meeting was convened.110  In 
attendance were al-Timimi, Hamdi, Hammad Adbur-Raheem, Caliph Basha Adbur-Raheem, 
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Surratt, and Ali Asad Chandia.111   Al-Timimi told the group the same information that he told 
the group at the September 16 meeting.112  Chandia immediately quit his job and flew to Pakistan 
and proceeded to the LET camp and received jihad training.113  Surratt, who had a family and did 
not wish to fight, simply left the country (hijra).114
The government introduced numerous speeches given by al-Timimi.  One of the most 
controversial speeches introduced was the “Space Shuttle” speech, delivered shortly after the 
space shuttle Columbia exploded upon reentry into the earth’s atmosphere on February 1, 
2003.115  In it, al-Timimi proclaims that “[t]here is no doubt that Muslims were overjoyed 
because of the adversity that befell their greatest enemy.”116  Always interested in omens, al-
Timimi goes on to describe the numerous omens evoked by space shuttle explosion that foretold 
the coming doom of the United States.117  In another speech entitled World Advice to the Salafis, 
al-Timimi says, “Waging jihad in the path of Allah is an unceasing obligatory duty until the Day 
of Judgment, not to be forsaken because of the lack of a khalifa.”118
D. Applicable Law Covering Advocacy of Illegal Activity
Initially, it is worth noting that advocacy of illegal activity cases are relatively rare.  This 
is in part due to the fact that there have only existed a few political organizations that have 
openly sought to accomplish the organization’s goals through illegal means.  Consequently, 
advocacy of illegal activity cases appear for a time and then disappear for many years, 
paralleling the wax and wane of these broad political movements.  The first political movement 
111
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that advocated illegal activity was the Socialist movement of the late nineteenth century and 
early twentieth century, followed by the Communist movement after World War II.  It is possible 
that today we are engaged in the third act of advocacy cases, that of Islamist activism.  However, 
as yet, the Supreme Court has not formulated new First Amendment law based on a case 
involving Islamist activism.  The odd case is Brandenburg v. Ohio119 which is the seminal case 
for advocacy of illegal activity and does not fit the broad political movement paradigm.
1. The Socialist Movement of the Early Twentieth Century
The first advocacy cases were almost exclusively confined to the prosecution of members 
of the socialist party in and around the First World War.120  Most, if not all, of the Socialists 
“illegal” activity that was prosecuted at that time would be permissible today.  Yet at that time, 
the pamphleteering, parades and organized rallies conducted by the Socialists during World War 
I were deemed a threat to national security and were not given protection by the First 
Amendment.  Many members of the Socialist party, including Eugene V. Debs himself, were 
imprisoned for voicing their concern that “the war was being fought for the profits of the rich, 
but with the blood of the poor.”121
How ironic that our discussion of Ali al-Timimi starts with Schenck v. United States.122
Al-Timimi was convicted of speech that incited young Muslim men to participate in armed 
conflict123, while Schenck was convicted of pamphleteering to dissuade young men from 
enlisting in the armed services during World War I124.  Schenck is one our nation’s earliest cases 
on the advocacy of illegal activity and the court was not prepared to give the First Amendment 
119
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free reign.  Justice Holmes’ opinion qualified advocacy by opining that “the character of every 
act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done” and on the “proximity and degree.”125
Accordingly, the court set down the “clear and present danger” test that would endure for almost 
40 years.  Advocacy of illegal activity would be protected unless the “words used are used in 
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will 
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”126  Here, the court was 
giving the government a wide latitude to prosecute speculatively dangerous speech.  The time 
frame for the actual danger in Schenck, that someone would read the pamphlet and decide not to 
enlist, was anywhere from imminent to several months or years.  This is important because as we 
shall see, the Supreme Court, in the years to come, will retreat from the speculative danger that is 
“clear and present” and hold that the danger must be “imminent.”127
All of the Socialist cases came out with the same result: no First Amendment protection.  
Yet there is a subtle distinction to be drawn from the case Gitlow v. New York128.  In Schecnk, the 
statute at issue, the 1917 Espionage Act, prohibited actions, not speech.129  The speech was not 
protected because the speech could lead to actions that would violate the statute.130  In Gitlow, 
the statutes at issue were the New York Penal Laws §§ 160, 161, which prohibited speech 
itself.131  Justice Holmes in dissent affirmed his “clear and present danger” test and opined that 
the danger to the nation was too remote.132  Responding to the majority’s claim that “[The Left 
Wing] manifesto was more than a theory, that it was an incitement,” he wrote that “[e]very idea 
123
 Superceding Indictment, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385), available at http://www.altimimi.org.
124 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49.
125 Id. at 52.
126 Id. at 52.
127
 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
128 Gitlow, 268 U.S. 652.
129 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49.
130 Id. at 52-53.
131 Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 654.
Tim Davis
18
is an incitement.”133
The last of the Socialist cases, Whitney v. California134 was decided in 1927.  Twenty-
four years would go by before another illegal advocacy case would hit the Supreme Court.  The 
prosecution of Communists began in earnest during the McCarthyism era.  Communism was 
similar in philosophy to Socialism, yet the Communist movement now had a super power nation 
supporting their efforts.
2. The Communist Movement of the 1950s and early 1960s
There were four important cases during this era: Dennis v. United States135, Yates v. 
United States136, Scales v. United States137; Noto v. United States138.  These cases mark the first 
time the Supreme Court was willing to give advocacy of illegal acts First Amendment protection, 
reversing the holdings in the Socialist cases.  I only dare to analyze these oft-analyzed cases 
because it is necessary to highlight certain aspects of the holdings.  The Supreme Court has 
defined numerous examples of protected and non-protected activity in these cases, including 
requisite evidence.  All of the Communist era cases evolve from violations of the 1946 Smith 
Act, which is still codified today at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385, entitled Advocating Overthrow of 
Government.
a) Dennis v. United States
Decided during the heyday of McCarthyism, the Court in Dennis upheld all of the 
132
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134 Whitney, 274 U.S. 357.
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convictions for all of the defendants for violations of the Smith Act.139  The Court was not going 
to let the “powerful forces in the world today [misuse] the privileges of liberty in order to destroy 
her.”140  Consequently, the Court was not going to permit Communist advocacy speech to 
flourish unabated and demand that “before the Government may act, it must wait until the putsch 
is about to be executed, the plans have been laid and the signal awaited.”141  With the seriousness 
of danger evoked by Communism foremost in the majority’s mind, the Supreme Court 
sidestepped the “clear and present danger” test and adopted the test advanced by Chief Judge 
Learned Hand who wrote for the court below.142  Hand wrote, “in each case (courts) must ask 
whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free 
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.”143  Once the court concluded that the danger was 
sufficient, the invasion of free speech was permissible.144
Justice Frankfurter, even though he concurred in the opinion, discussed the propriety of 
using “imminent peril” instead of the “clear and present danger.”145  In the end, he refused to go 
against precedent and “risk an ad hoc judgement influenced by the impregnating atmosphere of 
the times.”146
Justice Black was willing to go much further.  He opined that an “unfettered 
communication of ideas” was inherently dangerous, but as far as the Founders were concerned, 
the benefits from free expression were worth the risk.147  Similarly in dissent with Justice Black, 
Justice Douglas opined that the Founders “were not cowards” nor did “they exalt order at the 
139 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 517.
140
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141
 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951).
142 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510.
143 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510.
144 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 511.
145
 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 527-28 (1951).
146
 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 528 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
147
 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 580 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
Tim Davis
20
cost of liberty.”148  But more importantly, Justice Douglas implored that “immediate injury to 
society” should be the criterion by which advocacy speech is judged.149  The Court was evolving 
and had certainly come a long way from the Court in Schenck.  But the Court here, as was the 
Court in Schecnk, was very concerned about advocacy speech that was a smoke screen for 
criminality, namely the crimes of conspiracy, solicitation, and aiding and abetting.
b) Yates v. United States
Yates was decided in 1957, several years after public support for Senator Joseph 
McCarthy had withered.150  The “calmer times, when present pressures, passions and fears 
subside” discussed by Justice Black in Dennis were upon the Court.151  Now the Court was 
positioned to decide an advocacy case without the threat of a public backlash fueled by hysteria.  
As a result, the Supreme Court outright acquitted five members of the Communist party.152
The court emphasized the distinction between “advocacy in the realm of ideas” and the 
“advocacy of action.”153  “The essential distinction is that those to whom the advocacy is 
addressed must be urged to do something, now or in the future, rather than merely to believe in 
something.”154  Because the trial court did not make this distinction, the nine remaining cases 
were remanded with new instructions.155  The court rejected the trial court’s rationale “that all 
such advocacy was punishable whether it is language of incitement or not.”156  Instead, the court 
held that abstract advocacy divorced from action could not be punished.157  However, advocacy 
148
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with an effort to instigate action coupled with evil intent was punishable.158
c) Scales v. United States and Noto v. United States
Scales and Noto were decided on the same day, June 5, 1960, and stand for the same 
proposition: mere membership alone in an organization that advocates the violent overthrown of 
the Unites States government cannot be prosecuted.159  However, “active” participation can be 
punished, as opposed to “nominal” membership.160
In a rare occurrence, the Supreme Court reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence in both 
cases.161  In Scales, the court found widespread, deliberate, and focused advocacy of the violent 
overthrown of the United States government, and upheld the convictions.162  However, in Noto, 
even though Noto was a member of Communist Party, a party that advocated the violent 
overthrow of the United States government, he himself did not publicly advocate the violent 
overthrow of the government.163  The trial court found that Noto was actively carrying out the 
methods of his teachings by implementing his “industrial concentration” program.164  The 
program exhorted Communist Party members to assume positions of leadership in unions and in 
key industries such as steel, railroad, and mining.165  When the time was right, these Party 
members would shut down these industries by striking.166  The court found insufficient evidence 
that Noto was implementing a plan to violently overthrow the government because all of his 
activities were patently legal.167  The court held:
158 Yates, 354 U.S. at 319.
159 Scales, 367 U.S. at 220; Noto, 291-92.
160 Scales, 367 U.S. at 221-223
161 Scales, 367 U.S. at 230-57; Noto, 367 U.S. at 291-300.
162 Scales, 367 U.S. at 255.
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[T]he evidence as to that [industrial concentration] program might justify an infer ence 
that the leadership of the Party was preparing the way for a situation in which future acts 
of sabotage might be facilitated, but there is no evidence that such acts of sabotage were 
presently advocated; and it is present advocacy, and not an intent to advocate in the 
future or a conspiracy to advocate in the future once a groundwork has been laid, which 
is an element of the crime under the membership clause.168
Furthermore, the court reiterated its holding in Yates that “that the mere abstract teaching of 
Communist theory, including the teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a 
resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it 
to such action.”169  This quote is one of the few quotes from any of the preceding advocacy cases 
that would later be cited in per curiam opinion in Brandenburg.170
3. Brandenburg v. Ohio
Brandenburg is now the seminal case for advocacy of illegal activity.  It was decided at 
the tail end of the Communist Party advocacy cases in 1969, less than eight years after the 
decisions in Scales and Noto.171  The opinion would seem to tie up all of the loose ends of the 
previous advocacy cases, however there remains a lingering debate over the reach and 
interpretations of the opinion.
a) Brandenburg
If nothing else, Brandenburg finally overruled the “clear and present danger” test.  The 
principle holding in Brandenburg states:
168 Noto, 367 U.S. at 298.
169 Noto, 367 U.S. at 297-98.
170 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448.
171 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444.
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the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid 
or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy 
is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action.172
However, in the very next sentence, the court draws from Noto and distinguishes “abstract 
advocacy” from “preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.”173  Notice 
how the principal Brandenburg holding does not mention “abstract” and the Noto cite does not 
mention “imminency.”  To add to the confusion, later in a footnote, the court states that 
“[s]tatutes affecting the right of assembly, like those touching on freedom of speech, must 
observe the established distinctions between mere advocacy and incitement to lawless action.”174
It could be argued that this footnote might condone advocacy to action that did not incite 
imminent lawless action.  Although the court would never have granted full protection to 
advocacy to action that does not incite imminent lawless action because that would permit a wide 
range of speech-only criminal activity to flourish such as conspiracy, solicitation, extortion, 
threats, harassment, etc. 
The Supreme Court has shed some light on the Brandenburg decision in Stewart v. 
McCoy.175 Even though a denial of certiorari does not require explanation, Justice Stewart issued 
a short opinion to comment on an issue raised in the petition: whether teaching can be considered 
advocacy under Brandenburg.176  The Court of Appeals held that McCoy’s “teaching” speech 
172 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
173 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448.
174 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449.
175 537 U.S. 993 (2002).  McCoy was a member of a California gang before moving to Arizona.  At two social 
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was protected under Brandenburg, as long as it did not incite imminent lawless action.177  Justice 
Stewart responded by stating that that holding was “surely debatable.”178  Later he states that the 
case law has not considered the extent of protections for instructional speech.179  More 
importantly for our purposes, Justice Stewart clearly states that the opinion in Brandenburg
“expressly encompassed nothing more than ‘mere advocacy.’”180  Thus, after this opinion, it 
would seem that advocacy to action is not protected under Brandenburg.
Yet, how will the lower courts be able to divine the separation between criminal speech 
and protected advocacy?  The line between mere advocacy and advocacy to action is not always 
clear.  In Indiana v. Hess181, discussed more thoroughly in the next section, the defendant was 
engaging in advocacy to action, nonetheless his case was deemed to fall under the Brandenburg
rubric.  Or will the courts “know it when they see it”?  Some courts do just that, simply declare 
that the speech is not advocacy and therefore not protected.182  However, there does seem to be a 
common thread that runs through all of these advocacy cases including Brandenburg: the more 
the speech moves away from the ethereal world of ideas to the concrete world of action, the more 
the speech moves from protected to unprotected.  An equally important corollary is the more 
imminent or apparent the speech created danger is, the less the speech is protected.  Consistent 
with this proposition, it is worth noting that Brandenburg did not explicitly overrule Dennis or 
Yates and courts are free to weigh the “gravity” of the danger to facilitate the desired outcome.183
Adding to the Brandenburg opinion confusion is that there have been various 
177 McCoy, 537 U.S. at 994.
178 McCoy, 537 U.S. at 994.
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interpretations of what “imminent” means.
b) Imminency
The seminal case on the interpretation of Brandenburg’s “imminent” requirement is Hess 
v. Inidiana.184  In Hess, the defendant was participating in an antiwar demonstration on the 
Campus of Indiana University.185  In an effort to retain some control over the demonstration, 
police officers moved the demonstrators off the street on the sidewalks.186  It was then that the 
defendant uttered, “We’ll take the fucking streets later.”187  He was promptly arrested for 
disorderly conduct.188  The Supreme Court reversed the conviction holding that “the statement . . 
. amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time.”189
Here the court clarified the Brandenburg test wording by stipulating that “imminent” means 
“now” or “immediately.”
Most courts adhere to the Hess court’s narrow interpretation of the Brandenburg test.190
On the other hand, in People v. Rubin,191 the court held that five weeks was imminent.192  Most 
courts are loath to grant First Amendment protections to criminal speech, and the Rubin court 
was no exception.  In its avid pursuit to punish solicitation to murder,193 the court contorted itself 
while attempting to fit into the framework of Brandenburg and Hess.
183
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c) Specificity
As a practical matter, specificity in speech will carry the speaker out of protected speech 
into the realm of criminality.  Advocacy of ideas, mere advocacy, or abstract advocacy advance 
generalities as opposed to specifics.  In Brandenburg, Brandenburg said, “Bury the [blacks].”194
Yet, suppose Brandenburg had said, “See that black man over there, go bury him!”  In that 
instance, the speech is advocacy to action and is very close to incitement or solicitation of 
murder.  One might think that the “imminency” requirement of Brandenburg would limit the 
speaker’s criminal liability.  However, the specificity of the incitement permits the courts to label 
the speech “non-advocacy” and skip Brandenburg altogether.  At this point, the courts turn to 
evidence of the intent of the speaker and weigh the gravity of the “advocacy to action.”
4. The Federal Crime of Solicitation
a) History
The Federal crime of solicitation was enacted in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act 
(“the Act”) of 1984, thirty-six years after the Federal crime of conspiracy was enacted into law in 
1948.  The Act was a massive piece of legislation that encompassed numerous additions and 
changes to Federal criminal law.  Tucked away in Chapter X: Miscellaneous Violent Crime 
Amendments was the crime of solicitation, which stated:
Makes it a Federal offense to solicit an individual to commit a felony that has as an 
element the use or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of 
another.
Although there was discussion in Senate Judiciary committee to allow for a broader range of 
193 Rubin, 96 Cal. App. 3d at 979.
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offenses, the enacted version of the crime of solicitation only applies to crimes of violence.195
b)  “Strongly Corroborative Circumstances”
The seminal case showcasing the newly enacted Federal crime of solicitation was United 
States v. Gabriel.196  The defendants in Gabriel were convicted of attempted arson, conspiracy 
and solicitation, in that they tried to hire an arsonist to burn down their store.197  In response to 
the defendant’s assertion that the government did not establish their criminal intent to solicit the 
crime of arson, Judge Wood referenced the legislative history.198  The Senate Report attached to 
the Act stated that “the surrounding circumstances in general must indicate that the solicitor is 
serious that the person solicited actually carry out the crime.”199  Included in the report were 
examples of “strongly corroborative circumstances” that are highly probative of intent:
(i) the fact that the defendant offered or promised payment or some other benefit to the 
person solicited if he would commit the offense; 
(ii) the fact that the defendant threatened harm or some other detriment to the person 
solicited if he would not commit the offense; 
(iii) the fact that the defendant repeatedly solicited the commission of the offense, held 
forth at length in soliciting the commission of the offense, or made express protestations 
of seriousness in soliciting the commission of the offense; 
(iv) the fact that the defendant believed or was aware that the person solicited had 
previously committed similar offenses; 
(v) the fact that the defendant acquired weapons, tools or information suited for use by 
the person solicited in the commission of the offense, or made other apparent 
preparations for the commission of the offense by the person solicited.200
When any of these “strongly corroborative circumstances” are present, the government is quick 
to show that relationship.  However, when none of the circumstances are present in a case, such 
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as in United States v. Rahman201 and United States v. al-Timimi, the “strongly corroborative 
circumstances” are glossed over or not even mentioned.  To be fair, the Senate Report clearly 
indicated that these factors are “not exclusive or conclusive indicators of intent to solicit.”202
Neither was the Senate Report prescient to foresee religious fundamentalists who personally gain 
nothing from their solicited acts.  Nonetheless, it is so much more persuasive to a jury or an 
appeals court when a defendant’s actions are implicated by one or more of the “strongly 
corroborative circumstances.”
5. Crime-Facilitating Speech of Aiding and Abetting
Even though several of the Communist era cases considered teaching, instructing, and 
aiding and abetting speech, the primary focus of this article up to this point has been criminality 
of speech that incites or encourages another person to commit a crime.  Incitement speech must 
precede the formation of the intent to commit the crime by the recipient-doer.  Here for the first 
time, criminal speech is considered in the context that the recipient-doer has already formed the 
intent to commit a crime.
  Crime-facilitating speech is speech that “provides information that makes it easier for 
people to commit crimes, torts, or other harms.”203  Crime-facilitating speech is a broad topic 
with numerous complexities that has achieved only scant guidance from the Supreme Court.  
However, the topic must be addressed because the government charged al-Timimi with aiding 
and abetting, which can take the form of speech.  Furthermore, within aiding and abetting 
speech, there are two flavors: speech that steels the recipient to commit the crime and speech that 
instructs how to accomplish or perpetrate the crime.  It will be my contention that the 
201
 United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2nd Cir. 1999).
202 Gabriel, 810 F.2d at 635.
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government did not prove that al-Timimi prepared the Khan defendants for jihad or taught them 
how to take up jihad.  However, there is a reasonable question of fact as to whether al-Timimi 
encouraged or steeled the Khan defendants to stay the course once they had decided to take up 
jihad.  Only these two components of crime-facilitating speech will be covered here.  
a) Instructional Speech as Aiding and Abetting 
Justice Stewart in McCoy left open the question whether instructional speech is 
punishable.204  However, in McCoy, the trial court convicted and the Arizona Court of Appeals 
affirmed the conviction.205  In fact, the tradition in the lower courts is to fully prosecute 
instructional speech.  This is plainly evident in the spate of “tax reform” cases of the 1970s and 
1980s.206  Not only was the physical assistance in filling out forms prosecuted207, but as in 
United States v. Buttorff,208 mere speech that instructed the audience how to fill out various 
forms in violation of the tax law was also prosecuted.209  In Buttorff, the meeting attendees went 
home and investigated other methods of “tax reform” in the “marketplace of ideas” and then 
decided to follow Buttorff’s advice.210
Equally disturbing is the line of cases that permit the punishment of the written word as 
aiding and abetting.211  Yet, the “speaker's enthusiasm for the result”212 is nontrivial difference 
204 McCoy, 537 U.S. at 995.
205 McCoy, 537 U.S. at 993.
206 See United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d  549 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that soliciting or counseling a violation of 
the law is not protected under the First Amendment); United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1978). 
(holding that explanations on how to avoid withholding are not advocacy and hence not protected).
207
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between the written word and speech.  
But what is clear in both oral and written aiding and abetting speech cases is that when 
the “gravity of danger” is sufficient, the courts will freely sacrifice the First Amendment.  In the 
last paragraph of the McCoy opinion, written in 2002, Justice Stewart states that “the First 
Amendment does not prevent restrictions on speech that have ‘clear support in public 
danger.’”213 Video games and pornography are not sufficiently grave while murder for hire and 
tax evasion are.  It is a small wonder that the Supreme Court had even permitted speech that 
advocated the violent overthrow of the country214 and hate speech sprinkled with veiled threats 
of physical violence.215  On the heels of 9/11, there will be little debate as to which side of the 
“gravity” fence that terrorism will fall.
b) Encouraging or Steeling Speech as Aiding and Abetting 
There is not much authority where a speaker was prosecuted for merely encouraging or 
steeling another person to commit a crime when that person had already formed the intent to 
commit the crime.  In general, the person who solicits the crimes usually aids and abets the 
crime.  Consequently, the solicitor is prosecuted for both crimes at the same time, as in the al-
Timimi case.216
6. United States v. Rahman
Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman was tried and convicted for seditious conspiracy, 
300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting wrongful death claim against maker of a violent video game); Herceg v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987) (rejecting claim that article on auto-erotic asphyxiation 
incited imminent lawless action and raising the question of whether written materials could ever create culpable 
imminent incitement under Brandenburg).
212
 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925).
213 McCoy, 537 U.S. at 995.
214 Yates, 354 U.S. at 319.
215 Brandenburg, 
Tim Davis
31
conspiracy and solicitation to the murder of Egyptian President Mubarak, soliciting an attack on 
American military installations, and bombing conspiracy.217  Rahman, otherwise known as the 
“blind sheik,” was indeed blind and could only participate in those acts through speech.  The 
government contended that Rahman generally remained a level above the details of the 
individual operations, or in other words, he was the ringleader.218
In Rahman, the government introduced speeches previously delivered by the defendant 
where he instructed his followers to “do jihad with the sword, with the cannon, with grenades, 
with the missile . . . against God’s enemies.”219  However, the crucial evidence proffered by the 
government was a number of Rahman’s conversations taped by law enforcement agencies.220  A 
sample of these conversations include:
Rahman told Salem he "should make up with God . . . by turning his rifle's barrel to 
President Mubarak's chest, and killing him."
On another occasion, speaking to Abdo Mohammed Haggag about murdering President 
Mubarak during his visit to the United States, Rahman told Haggag, "Depend on God. 
Carry out this operation. It does not require a fatwa . . . You are ready in training, but do 
it. Go ahead."
The evidence further showed that Siddig Ali consulted with Rahman about the bombing 
of the United Nations Headquarters, and Rahman told him, "Yes, it's a must, it's a duty."
On another occasion, when Rahman was asked by Salem about bombing the United 
Nations, he counseled against it on the ground that it would be "bad for Muslims," but 
added that Salem should "find a plan to destroy or to bomb or to . . . inflict damage to the 
American Army."221
The appeals court affirmed that Rahman’s words instructed, solicited and/or persuaded others to 
commit crimes and thus was not protected speech.222  The court touched on the “strongly 
corroborative circumstances” from Gabriel, yet did not furnish any facts that related to the 
216
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enumerated examples given by the Senate Report.223  Instead, the court merely stated that intent 
was as issue for the jury and upon the facts of the case, the jury was within its discretion to find 
Rahman guilty.224  Furthermore, the court held that Rahman could not assert immunity based on 
a religious ministry because freedom of religion is not a protection from prosecution for 
generally applicable laws.225  Lastly, the court upheld the government’s introduction of 
Rahman’s public speeches to demonstrate criminal intent, even though the speeches were
protected by the First Amendment.226
The Rahman case is quite similar to the al-Timimi case.  In each case, a Muslim cleric or 
scholar was prosecuted for soliciting, counseling, aiding and abetting acts of terrorism.  Each of 
the men were adherents to a fundamental strain of Islam that advocated jihad and that jihad was a 
duty.227  In each case, the government introduced the defendant’s public speeches to demonstrate 
motive.  However, the similarities end there.  Rahman had attained the level of Mufti and could 
issue fatwas (opinions or rulings), al-Timimi had not.  Rahman authorized all of his directives by 
issuing the requisite fatwas228, where al-Timimi had to rely on other Muslim scholars for 
religious rulings.  Rahman was in constant communications with his co-conspirators, giving 
them direction at every turn.229  Al-Timimi was a distant observer of the Khan defendants and 
221 Rahman, 189 F.3d at 117.
222 Rahman, 189 F.3d at 117.
223 Rahman, 189 F.3d at 125-26.
224 Rahman, 189 F.3d at 125-26.
225 Rahman, 189 F.3d at 117.
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hardly knew them.230  Rahman had an agenda of terrorism231 in contrast to al-Timimi who was 
simply giving guidance to his followers.  Despite these differences, the government used the 
Rahman trial as a template to prosecute al-Timimi.
III. Analysis 
Currently, al-Timimi’s case is being appealed and this analysis was written with that 
appeal in mind.  However, the analysis aims a bit lower and merely attempts to poke weaknesses 
in the prosecution’s case against al-Timimi.  It was written to provide a broad picture of the 
actual case against al-Timimi and not to raise particular appellate issues.
A. Toughest Evidence to Overcome
The toughest evidence that al-Timimi must overcome is that after attending the meeting 
at Kwon ‘s house on September 16, 2001, Kwon, Hasan, Aatique, and Khan, four meeting 
attendees, dropped their lives in the United States and headed off to Pakistan and trained in a 
LET terrorist camp.  After attending another meeting in October, Surratt left the country and 
Chandia also headed off to the LET camp in Pakistan.  For a jury that is grappling with a very 
complex case involving serious issues, here was a simple issue of cause and effect that could 
easily be grasped.  Al-Timimi’s fate was sealed when the government introduced al-Timimi’s 
anti-American speeches, his contacts with various Muslim scholars some of whom have links to 
terrorism, and that fact that al-Timimi was well respected by the Khan defendants.
Furthermore, Buttorff is the case that is closest on point and possibly the most difficult for 
al-Timimi to overcome.  The principles in Buttorff were investigating other means to evade 
230 See Transcripts, Testimony of Khwaja Mahmood Hasan, Pleading 117, United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 
1:04cr385); Transcript, Testimony of Yong Ki Kwon, Pleading 97 and 98,United States v. Al-Timimi, (No. 
1:04cr385).
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taxes.232  Yet, after attending a meeting presented by the defendants, it was then that the 
principles decided to evade federal income taxes using the defendant’s methods.233  The Court of 
Appeals in Buttorff sidestepped any Brandenburg analysis by holding that the speech was not 
advocacy and not entitled Brandenburg’s speech protections.234  By invalidating the 
“imminency” requirement in Brandenburg, the court could uphold the guilty verdict despite the 
fact that the Buttorff principles filed their tax returns several days and weeks after the meeting.235
In sidestepping Brandenburg, the Court of Appeals in Buttorff did not explicitly reference 
the “gravity of danger” rationale in Dennis, instead the court casually mentioned the “potential of 
substantially hindering the administration of [tax] revenue.”236  Likewise, in another tax evasion 
case, the court in Freeman cited Buttorff for the proposition that “[t]ax evasion is a wrong of 
sufficient gravity that Congress can punish incitement to the crime.”237  If al-Timimi went 
beyond mere advocacy and the courts are free to weigh the “gravity of the danger” when 
deciding First Amendment protections, then al-Timimi does not stand a chance under the specter 
of supporting terrorism.  Yet, there are a number of factors present in the Al-Timimi case that 
tend to move al-Timimi’s speech toward the protected sphere of Brandenburg.
1. Ringleader
As I began my research for this article, I read a number of motions and portions of the 
transcripts from the Al-Timimi trial.  My first impression was that the prosecution was attempting 
to portray al-Timimi not just as a ringleader, but as a Mafia don sitting behind the scenes, pulling 
the strings and keeping a safe distance between himself and the day-to-day machinations of his 
232 Buttorff, 572 F.2d at 622-23.
233 Buttorff, 572 F.2d at 622-23.
234 Buttorff, 572 F.2d at 624.
235 Buttorff, 572 F.2d at 622.
236 Buttorff, 572 F.2d at 624.
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crime syndicate.  I was not surprised upon reading the first paragraph of prosecution’s rebuttal 
closing argument that dispelled First Amendment privileges for criminals like Tony Soprano, the 
crime boss of the hit HBO series, The Sopranos.238  Mr. Kromberg said: 
[W]hen Tony Soprano says, “Go Whack that guy,” that’s not protected speech.  And 
when Tony Soprano’s lawyer said, “My client didn’t say, “Go whack that guy,” but even 
if he did, it was protected speech,” that’s not a good argument.”239
To be fair, Mr. Kromberg was not implying that al-Timimi was like Tony Soprano, but the mere
mention of mobster dons is prejudicial when a key component of the government’s case alleges 
that al-Timimi was the ringleader of the “Virginia jihad network.”
In fact, there is no evidence that al-Timimi was the “Virginia jihad network” ringleader.  
Mr. Kromberg elicited testimony from the Khan defendants that al-Timimi was well respected 
and answered many of their questions concerning Islam.   Mr. Kromberg characterized that 
relationship when he said the Khan defendants “couldn’t figure out how to tie their shoelaces 
without asking al-Timimi.”240  Yet, to understand the relationship between al-Timimi and the 
Khan defendants, it is necessary to touch on a particularity of the Muslim religion.  Most 
Americans are familiar with the some variation of Judeo-Christian ethic, which lays out broad 
guidelines for moral conduct, namely the Ten Commandments and the Golden Rule (“Treat other 
as you want to be treated”).  In contrast the Qur’an specifically details all acceptable and 
prohibited conduct; all facets of a Muslim’s life are spelled out.  However, not every possible 
situation is covered in the Qur’an, especially situations that could not have occurred a thousand 
237 Freeman, 761 F.2d at 552.
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years ago when the Qur’an was written, such as praying in a moving car.  As a result Qur’anic 
scholars and muftis are often consulted for rulings.  For instance, the Grand Ayatollah Sistani is a 
renowned Shi’ite scholar in Iraq and has his own website, www.sistani.org.241  Anyone can ask 
the Ayatollah questions and his assistants will retrieve the question and then ask the Ayatollah 
himself.  The answer will be sent in a reply email.  No question is too mundane.  For instance, 
fatwa 2648 reads: 
It is unworthy to drink too much water; to drink water after eating fatty food; and to drink 
water while standing during the night. It is also unworthy to drink water with one's left 
hand; to drink from the side of a container which is cracked or chipped off, or from the 
side of its handle.242
No question is too mundane, even if it involves shoelace tying.  This type of relationship 
between Muslim scholars and Muslim devotees is quite common and it is misleading for Mr. 
Kromberg to compare it to the relationship between a Mafia crime don and his henchmen.
That is not to say that Muslim scholars such as Ayatollah Sistani do not hold great respect 
and devotion from their followers that sometimes borders on zealousness.  In that respect, much 
depends on the individual Muslim scholar and what he demands from the devotion of his 
followers. Cleric Moqtada Sadr, another well-respected Shiite Muslim scholar in Iraq, organized 
his followers into the Madhi Army.  While the Mahdi Army was only a loosely organized 
paramilitary group, it held off the United States Army in the battle in the holy city of Najaf for 
several weeks before a peace settlement could be arranged.243  But it would be a mistake to put 
al-Timimi on the same level with either of these two Iraqi clerics.  Although al-Timimi was a 
241
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rising star in the Muslim community, he was not a mufti (able to render fatwas or opinions) and 
he had to rely on other more established Muslim scholars for their fatwas.  Al-Timimi merely 
relayed these fatwas to all members of the Center.  
In fact, the government has made much of the fact that al-Timimi brought the al-Uqla 
fatwa to the September 16th meeting at Kwon’s house.244  Testimony was introduced that al-
Timimi gave it to Masoud Khan with the instructions to burn it after reading it.245  Rather than 
supporting the prosecution’s allegations that al-Timimi was a ringleader, this incident 
demonstrates that al-Timimi was obligated to follow the Islamic rulings of other clerics.  
However, the allegation that al-Timimi was the “Virginia jihad network” ringleader was a 
crucial part of the government’s case vis-à-vis the First Amendment.  If al-Timimi remains at 
arms-length from the Khan defendants, his speech is more likely to be protected by the First 
Amendment, so long as the speech did not cause an imminent violation of the law.  In a similar 
manner as the defendant in Brandenburg, disassociated from the attendees at the KKK rally, al-
Timimi can advocate at a distance.  This is in stark contrast to the Mafia boss who is connected 
to all phases of his operation and benefits immensely from its continuing criminal activities.  
Behind every Supreme Court advocacy of illegal action decision, there is the abhorrent thought 
that a Mafia don might invoke First Amendment protections for orders to his underlings to 
commit violent crimes.  
This is exactly why the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals would not extend First 
Amendment protections to Rahman.  There is little question that Rahman was a ringleader.  He 
directed the activities of his followers for the expressed purpose of terrorism bolstered by his 
243 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, At the Ready to Answer Sadr's Call, The Washington Post, August 28, 2004, A16.
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own religious rulings246 and his speech exhorted specific criminal activity.247  The Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals gave Rahman’s First Amendment defense short shrift.248
In contrast, al-Timimi did not associate with the Khan defendants, he was not friends 
with any of them.  In fact, other than the September 16th meeting, al-Timimi had minimal 
contact with the Khan defendants.  However, there is abundant testimony that al-Timimi 
answered numerous Islamic permissibility questions, not only from the Khan defendants but also 
from any Center attendee.  Rather than ordering the Khan  defendants to take up jihad on 
September 16th, he gave them a choice based on Muslim rulings: jihad, hijra, or lay like a rug.  
While “laying like a rug” may be perceived as derogatory, several of the meeting attendees chose 
that option.  At the second meeting in October, al-Timimi gave the same advice and one attendee 
chose jihad training, one chose hijra and left the country but did not participate in jihad training, 
and the rest chose to “lay like a rug.”  In fact, there is little or no evidence that al-Timimi 
directed anyone to do anything.  Rather the evidence points to a scholar who at all times was 
eager to give advice to anyone who would listen.  Instead of being a ringleader, al-Timimi was a 
low ranking Muslim scholar who was a messenger between other muftis and the Muslims at the 
Center.
Lastly, there is a dispute as to who initiated the September 16 meeting.  Kwon testified 
that al-Timimi called him right before the meeting was to take place and asked for permission to 
attend the meeting.249  After the events of 9/11 and the subsequent backlash against Muslims250, 
it is conceivable than al-Timimi was worried that the meeting attendees would plan something 
245
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Islamically impermissible.  Al-Timimi was not the Khan defendant’s lawyer and could not 
advise them as to the legality their plans for jihad training, instead he was their spiritual advisor 
who freely dispensed his firm belief that jihad is required of all Muslims.
2. Aiding and Abetting
There is little doubt that al-Timimi gave the Khan defendants a wide variety of advice on 
Islamic matters.  Moreover, there is no reason to doubt the testimony of Kwon and Hasan, each 
of whom corroborated the fact that al-Timimi gave them information specifically to facilitate 
their criminal objective – travel to Pakistan.  The problem is that everything that al-Timimi said 
to them was information that anybody could have given them.  Al-Timimi told them that when 
traveling: 1) to disguise your numbers like Joseph, 2) that if stopped to act scared and ask for our 
lawyers or our mothers or cry like a baby, 3) carry a magazine to look normal, and 4) that if 
Mahmood is detained, that Kwon should also stop because Kwon was not Pakistani and would 
not be able to find his way around Pakistan.  Al-Timimi’s advice arose from ordinary, run -of-
mill common sense that can readily be distinguished from Royer’s advice.  Royer gave each of 
the defendants who were heading to the LET camp the phone number of the LET office in 
Lahore, Pakistan.  Furthermore, he contacted the LET office himself to arrange for their travel.  
The LET office gave Royer the “kunyas” (aliases) that the men would travel under in Pakistan.  
Compare al-Timimi’s advice to the advice given in the tax reform cases, Freeman and Buttorff.  
In those cases the defendants gave technical advice on how to fill out tax forms to evade paying 
taxes.  Compare al-Timimi’s advice to the Hit Man book that gave detailed, step-by-step 
instructions in all aspects of perpetrating a contract killing and eluding detection.  Al-Timimi 
speech could hardly be deemed aiding and abetting.
Nonetheless, aiding and abetting can take the form of “steeling one to action.”  A case 
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can be made that al-Timimi did in fact steel some of the Khan defendants to action.  After the 
September 16 meeting, Kwon and Hasan immediately purchased airline tickets to travel to 
Pakistan on the 20th.251  Al- Timimi met with Kwon and Hasan on September 19 for lunch.252  It 
is alleged that al-Timimi discussed their plans and gave them more advice.253   Admittedly, this 
meeting smacks of “steeling one’s resolve to action.”  However, rarely in this country’s history 
has a defendant been prosecuted for merely steeling one to an action that they have already 
decided to do.  In fact, not a single case on point was found.  While this is not an overly 
convincing argument, it will have to suffice for now.
3. Solicitation
Solicitation can only happen before the recipient-doer has formed the intent to commit 
the crime.  This is especially import for al-Timimi for if the Khan  defendants formed the intent to 
travel to the LET camps prior to the September 16 meeting, then legally al-Timimi cannot be 
prosecuted for incitement.
a) Several of the Khan Defendants had already Traveled to the LET 
Camps
There was absolutely no testimony given that al-Timimi in any way influenced Royer, al-
Hamdi, or Chapman to travel to the LET camps in Pakistin before 9/11.  Neither is there any 
testimony that al-Timimi influenced Aatique to purchase his ticket for Pakistan before 9/11. 
One curious side affect of this travel is that nothing significant actually happened during 
the LET training.  All three men reported the same thing, that they fired all sorts of weapons and 
played war games in the mountains of Pakistan.  Royer, al-Hamdi, and Chapman all returned
251
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home to Virginia with glorified stories of their training, exhorting the paintball group back 
home.254  The important fact is that they returned home instead of being killed waging jihad.  
Had anyone been killed during one of these excursions, it is highly probable that the effect would 
have been dramatic on these men.  Without the threat of death, traveling to the LET camp had no 
dire consequences and was an exotic diversion from the routine of daily life in America.
Although the government contends that the Khan defendants were a dedicated group of 
terrorists, in actuality, they were a bunch of wannabes propped up by their own boasting.  There 
is testimony that Royer desperately tried to get involved in actual fighting in Bosnia, but the 
locals would not let him fight and sent him home.  Although the government contends that al-
Hamdi fired a weapon at Indian troops, there is no indication how serious the firefight with 
Indian troops was, if there even was a firefight.  In all probability, Al-Hamdi was miles from 
away from an actual Indian soldier.  Male pride and boasting motivated these men far more than 
al-Timimi speeches.
b) 9/11
One cannot describe the effect that 9/11 had on this country.  Without belaboring a well-
discussed topic, it is still important to portray the days after 9/11 from the viewpoint of a 
Muslim.  While many Americans were still shell-shocked after 9/11, some vented their 
frustrations on Muslims, Sikhs, and anyone who looked Middle Eastern.255  These reactions, 
though shameful, are examples of the frailty of human nature because the victims of these crimes 
almost assuredly had nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks.  Nonetheless, the effects of the conduct 
254
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on the Muslim community were devastating.256  Consequently, the role that 9/11 played in the 
Khan defendant’s decision to take up jihad training cannot be underestimated.
c) Cabela’s Jackets257
The defense elicited testimony that Khan and Kwon discussed the necessity of purchasing 
the jackets from Cabela’s on or about September 15th.258  Khan had already purchased a jacket 
for himself and brought the Cabela’s catalog to the September 16 meeting.259  Kwon later 
purchased three Cabela’s jackets based on Kahn’s recommendation.  Kwon purchased the jackets 
for himself, Hasan, and Hammad Adbur-Raheem.260
d) Intent and “Strongly Corroborative Circumstances”
The government did not elicit testimony or introduce any other evidence that any of the 
“strongly corroborative circumstances” from Gabriel were present in the Al-Timimi trial.  
However, those circumstances merely indicate the intent of the solicitor and the government is 
free to introduce other evidence of intent.  While no one would deny that al-Timimi is a devoted 
adherent to his faith and fully intended that his advice be followed, it is another matter entirely 
that al-Timimi had a personal stake in the Khan defendants’ endeavors to take up jihad.  
Furthermore, al-Timimi always spoke in generalities and rarely spoke about specific details 
about the manner in which someone might follow his advice.  In contrast to al-Timimi, 
Rahman’s taped conversation reveal his intent to wage a jihad in downtown New York City.261
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Rahman directly commanded his followers to assassinate Egyptian President Mubarak.262
Rahman’s intent can be drawn from these statements, whereas al-Timimi’s intent is not as 
obvious.
e) Solicitation Conclusion
If the Khan defendants did indeed form the intent to take jihad before the September 16 
meeting, then al-Timimi could be convicted based on “steeling” them to action at the meeting 
itself.  However, al-Timimi did not cross over the line of speech and commit any overt physical 
acts of aiding and abetting.  Likewise, as previously asserted, al-Timimi did not aid and abet the 
Khan defendants through instructional speech.  Furthermore, there is scant authority for the 
proposition that someone can be punished solely on the basis of “steeling” speech.  Accordingly, 
al-Timimi should not be sentenced to life in prison plus 70 years for averring his religious 
convictions.
At this point, a simple analogy might be helpful.  Suppose the Khan defendants are sitting 
on a toboggan at the top of a big snow-covered hill.  Did al-Timimi push them over the edge or 
did he merely stand on the side and give them a “thumbs up” sign?  There is more than sufficient 
evidence to conclude that al-Timimi gave them spiritual advice and nothing more.  Yet, after 
deliberating for seven days, the jury was convinced beyond and reasonable doubt that al-Timimi 
pushed that toboggan over the edge.  
4. Imminent Lawless Action
When trying to understand the rationale of  “imminent lawless action,” it is helpful to 
think of the pressure salesman.  Everyone has been pressured by a salesman and is thankful to 
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get out from under that pressure in order to make an informed purchasing decision.  Similarly, 
“imminent lawless action” under Brandenburg evolved with the realization that anyone can be 
incited to lawless action in the heat of the moment.  In contrast, when the incited person goes 
home, thinks about the proposition, tests the incitement speech in the “marketplace of ideas”, and 
then commits a crime the next day, it should be assumed that the incited person acted on his own 
volition.  Even though “imminent lawless action” is not an issue in this case, there are a few 
points worthy of discussion.
a) Long Distance Influence
While it may be conceded that al-Timimi did in fact exert significant influence over the 
Khan defendants, there remains considerable doubt that al-Timimi exerted enough influence over 
these men to have them drop their lives here in America, travel to foreign lands, wait for several 
weeks in the foreign land, obtain military training for another several weeks, and then possibly 
sacrifice their lives waging jihad based on one two-hour meeting.  Kwon testified that he and 
Hasan spent the first two weeks in Pakistan at Hasan’s uncle’s house.263  They passed the time by 
shopping and taking in the sights.264  Moreover, one can only imagine the array of anti-American 
influences present in Pakistan.  However, the jury never considered this evidence in under the 
Brandeburg rubric.  All they had to do was keep the criminality contained to the events of the 
September 16 meeting.  Nonetheless, it is clear that lawless action was not imminent.
b) Probability of Success
Al- Timimi’s speech equally fails the Hess test for the reason that the action was to be 
conducted at some “indefinite time in the future.”  Brandenburg and Hess require less 
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speculative lawless action.  The possibility that the Khan defendants could actually fight along 
side of the Taliban was very slim.  At the time of the September 16 and October meetings, the 
United States was not even engaged in hostilities with the Taliban.265  Although an attack was 
imminent (more so in October), any number of events could have circumvented the armed 
conflict.   Eventually the hostilities started on October 20th and were finished soon afterward on 
December 7th.266  In a post trial motion, Royer related his conversation about joining the Taliban 
when the topic was raised at the September 16 meeting.267  He said that if they went to 
Afghanistan that they would be most assuredly been shot as American spies.268  Added to this are 
a whole host of hurdles such as being able to cross the Afghan-Pakistani border, which was 
closed shortly after the conflict began.269  The Khan defendant’s chances to enter that conflict 
were almost zero.  Consequently, the lawless action would be “indefinite” according to Hess and 
too speculative to warrant punishment under Brandenburg.
IV. Conclusion
The terrorist attack on the United States on 9/11 was one of the worst disasters in our 
history.  Furthermore, it was preventable but for the bumbling ineptitude of our security 
agencies, chiefly the FBI, the CIA, and the Department of Justice.  No one can refute that these 
agencies had the actionable intelligence and the capability to thwart 9/11, but because of a 
number of factors ranging from downright incompetence to interagency turf battles, 9/11 was 
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smashing success for the terrorists.  Billions of dollars spent on research, technology, and 
salaries for these agencies and for the mere cost of $500,000, al-Qaeda outfoxed them all.  
Without a doubt, these revered institutions of our government looked like amateurs.
Railed against the might of the United States government is a ragtag assortment of radical 
Muslims, Usama bin Laden, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Mullah Omar, and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.  
Usama bin Laden has slipped through our fingers on several occasions and continues to stymie 
our government’s best efforts to catch him.  All of these men continue to be more than just an 
irritant, they are directing terrorist activities this very day in an attempt to kill or maim 
Americans, especially our soldiers in Iraq.
In fairness, there have been success stories as well.  The United States hunted down and 
captured Kalid Sheik Mohammed, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks.  The United States 
dislodged the Taliban and helped establish a stable government in Afghanistan, with relatively 
minor collateral damage.  And there has not been a terrorist attack within the United States since 
9/11.  To the government’s credit, these are solid accomplishments.
Eager to demonstrate to the world the effectiveness of our system of justice, the United 
States began to zealously prosecute terrorists after 9/11.  But, instead of success, the government 
has encountered numerous problems prosecuting terrorists.  In fact, contrary to government’s 
claim that it has successfully prosecuted over 200 terrorism cases, reporters at the Washington 
Post uncovered data that puts the number closer to 39.270  Add to this the missteps by the 
government in the Zacarias Moussaoui trial,271 problems with ill-conceived statutory 
construction of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B,272 and other related problems, and the government’s record is 
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less than stellar.  Any successful terrorism prosecution is welcome.
Against this backdrop, the trials of Khan and Al-Timimi unfolded.  No matter what the 
government claims, the Khan defendants did nothing more than play army in the foothills of 
Pakistan.  While there was a remote possibility for violence, the fact remains that they did not 
harm anybody.  Yet, Kahn received a life sentence plus 30 years and Chapman received 65 
years.  Unsatisfied, the government went after the Khan defendant’s spiritual leader, al-Timimi.  
With the full might of the FBI and the Department of Justice, the same organizations that 
“dropped the ball” on 9/11, the government descended upon al-Timimi like a “pack of wolves on 
an elk carcass.”  The lead prosecutor, Mr. Kromberg, used every opportunity to portray al-
Timimi as a religious zealot with links to terrorism who ordered his mindless devotees to take up 
jihad against Unites States soldiers, regardless of the actual truth.  Sadly, in the process, the First 
Amendment has taken another beating.
